November 17, 2026
This literature survey is a joint effort of multiple individuals. Principal authors include Jenny Ahlen, Richard Clayton, Khadija Foda, Julie Gorte, PhD, Taniya Goyal, Maxwell Homans, Sanford Lewis J.D, Holly Li, and Leola Ross, PhD, CFA. We thank Joseph Stiglitz, PhD, Danielle Fugere, Erin Markiewitz, PhD, and Maureen O’Brien.
Issue: On September 16, 2026, the Securities and Exchange Commission proposed rescinding Rule 14a-8, otherwise known as the Shareholder Proposal Rule. [2]
Rule 14a-8: Since 1942, eighty-four years as at this writing, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has facilitated and overseen shareholder proposals via its Rule 14a-8 (commonly, the Shareholder Proposal Rule, and in this note “the Rule”). The Rule establishes an efficient federal mechanism for shareholders to demonstrate their qualification to propose a vote, sets parameters around the proposal (e.g. format, length), and arbitrates which proposals are within scope for inclusion.
The Rule, along with a number of other implementing rules of securities laws, was meant to provide shareholders with a “reasonable opportunity to present their own proposals and views to fellow security holders,” recognizing that corporations have the responsibility to provide shareholders with “fair suffrage” in exchange for access to securities exchanges.” [3] Fair corporate suffrage, in turn, was recognized in a Supreme Court case as an important shareholder right “that should attach to every equity security bought on a public exchange,” according to the House of Representatives report accompanying H.R. 9323, which became the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. [4] Shareholder proposals were also recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Rule also implicitly recognized the principal-agent problem, long enshrined in securities regulation and economics literature, which states that shareholders (principals) may have different objectives than management (agents). First, while shareholders are, typically, interested in long-term value creation, management may be more interested in their own compensation or short-term performance. Second, management and shareholders may also have different risk tolerances. Even with different objectives and risk tolerances, publicly traded corporations are obligated to make decisions that are in the best interests of shareholders. The crux of such an obligation is to provide a mechanism for shareholders to express their preference—shareholder proposals are an informative, cost-efficient and explicit mechanism.
By rescinding the Rule, the SEC removes this efficient and explicit mechanism and, therefore, creates a negative economic impact. In the pages that follow, we identify several specific concerns relating to the economic impact of rescinding the Rule. In Section I, we review the literature relating to the explicit benefit of shareholder proposals to shareholders, and also set forth the case that shareholder proposals, in aggregate, are value-adding to all shareholders and may reduce risk. In Section II, we share case studies where corporations were subject to multi-billion-dollar judgments in cases where shareholders had highlighted governance issues well in advance—akin to canaries in a coal mine. In Section III, we calculate the costs associated with independent solicitations for small, medium and large companies or litigating shareholder proposals that companies do not include in the proxy statement. Also, we illustrate the costs associated with shifting the oversight of shareholder proposals from the SEC to States. In Section IV, we highlight where the argument put forth by the SEC in their rescission proposal is weakened by incorrectly interpreting economic literature. For each of these sections, we include a list of cited papers and other related readings. We conclude with an argument that rescinding the Rule is value reducing and risk increasing for shareholders, costly, and poorly reasoned.
Rather than rescind the Rule, the authors recommend that the SEC support shareholder proposals as it has for eighty-four years, while strengthening and improving the Rule to improve the implementation of shareholder proposals and support the feedback loop it provides for communicating preferences to corporate managers.
This post is a summary of the full literature review, The Economic Impact of Rescinding Rule 14a-8. Please find the complete letter attached.