November 16, 2026
Ceres has submitted a letter opposing the SEC’s proposed rule, Rescission of Rule 14a-8’s Federal Regulation of Shareholder Proposals and Amendments to Rule 14a-4 (the “Proposal” or “Proposing Release”), and has urged the Commission to withdraw the proposal.
An excerpt from the letter is included below. Please access the complete letter here.
“ FOR NUMEROUS REASONS RESCISSION OF RULE 14a-8 WOULD BE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS”
"The SEC's proposal would undo the principal means by which investors can make known their views on important or material matters to the boards and management of companies where they have invested their money. If adopted, it would create extraordinary uncertainty about the path forward for shareholders to influence corporate decision-making (and also for companies that think it important to engage with their shareholders); would make it particularly difficult or impossible for retail or small shareholders to make proposals and for others to vote on those proposals; would greatly impede shareholders' ability to drive important good-governance and other goals; would inevitably lead to an increase in litigation regarding what can or cannot go into a company's proxy statement; would prompt investors to take other paths such as "vote no" campaigns or proxy fights; and would have other untoward results. In general, rescission would be contrary to the SEC's mission of protecting investors, maintaining fair, orderly and efficient markets, and facilitating capital formation. Rescission would be arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act.
With all of the damaging impact of a rescission, the question becomes: why would the SEC contemplate such a move? The 228-page Proposing Release tries to provide answers, but they are unconvincing. [2] The foremost explanation seems to be that the SEC has recently discovered a statutory limitation on its rulemaking authority. But for more than 80 years, investors, companies, courts, Congress, legal scholars, and the SEC itself have either stated that such authority exists or assumed that it did. The three-person (now two-person), one-party Commission that issued the Proposal now concludes that all of these others were wrong, but it is mistaken.
Aside from the question of authority, the SEC offers various policy rationales, but these too are lacking. The argument is essentially that times have changed since the Rule was adopted – that costs to companies are "no longer small", [3] that most proposals do not receive majority support, [4] that the volume has increased, [5] and that State law is "unclear or silent as to what matters can be presented to shareholders" and "it is not the Commission's role to fill those gaps or impose uniformity through the Federal proxy rules". [6]
These policy conclusions can be briefly rebutted. As to costs increasing, much or most of this is due to companies seeking no-action relief to exclude proposals. While it is true that many proposals do not receive majority support, many of them do, as described in Appendix A and reported by Institutional Shareholder Services. [7] Others gain support over time and those that do not can be excluded under the Rule's provision disallowing the refiling of low-performing proposals. Proposals are important as a means for investors to signal their concerns to management, and the best-constructed proposals tend to be resolved without going to vote (a process of negotiation that we discuss further below in Appendix A).
With respect to the volume of proposals increasing, this is because they have been proven to be an effective means of shareholder action. And as to the applicable state law being unclear, this is not a new issue, unknown to the Commission when it adopted the Rule. Indeed, it is a primary reason why Congress enacted Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act.
Importantly, all of these policy rationales point in one direction: an attempt by the SEC to alleviate purported burdens on public companies. In the section of the Proposing Release headed "Policy Reasons for Rescinding Rule 14a-8", not a word is said about how important proposals have been in affecting corporate policies on governance, sustainability, and other financial or financially-related issues. The positive impact of the Rule on companies' financial and risk management is essential to any analysis of the Rule's merit, but the Commission has opted to don blinders.
The most puzzling aspect of what the SEC is doing is that, to our knowledge, there have not been any noteworthy demands from corporations for rescission of the Rule. There have been many suggestions for reform, and even shareholder advocates such as the Shareholder Rights Group suggested possible amendments in a petition submitted to the SEC, [8] but until now complete rescission has not been an objective of public companies whose burdens now trouble the Commission. In fact, public companies have often expressed support for a federal rule governing shareholder proposals. As recently as 2022 the Business Roundtable, while urging that some reforms be made to the Rule, explained the Rule's importance: "Rule 14a-8 has long provided shareholders with an inexpensive mechanism to put issues of concern before their fellow shareholders for consideration, including issues relating to significant policy issues" and it "is an important component of good corporate governance in the United States" (emphasis added). [9]
It also cannot be that, by rescinding the rule, the SEC will save itself time and resources. The SEC has already determined it will no longer consider no-action letter requests regarding shareholder proposals, so merely maintaining Rule 14a-8 on the books costs the SEC almost nothing.
In addition to the defects in the Commission's assessment of the statutory and policy issues, the Proposing Release's cost-benefit analysis comes nowhere close to what is required for SEC rulemaking. Among other things, the analysis estimates cost savings from rescission at $39.6 million per year, but that ignores the benefits that have resulted from implementing many proposals and reducing companies' risks. That amount is also dwarfed by the costs that would be imposed on companies and investors from an unsettled, fragmented state-by-state handling of legal and other issues relating to the proposal process. Significant costs would also be incurred if shareholders need to use alternative methods of shareholder advocacy outside of the Rule, such as independent solicitations. In sum, the Proposing Release does not contain the "reasoned analysis" that is legally required for rescission of an agency rule, much less a rule that has been relied upon by investors and companies alike for more than eight decades and has accomplished much. [10] We discuss below certain of the most prominent shortcomings of the SEC's position.”
References
[2] Rescission of Rule 14a-8’s Federal Regulation of Shareholder Proposals and Amendments to Rule 14a-4, Exchange Act Release No. 34-106383, File No. S7-2026-32, 91 Fed. Reg. 59,904 (Sept. 21, 2026). The 228 pages appear on the digital version of the Proposing Release posted by the Commission at https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/proposed/2026/34-106383.pdf. All page citations in this letter are to the Federal Register publication.
[3] Release, 91 Fed. Reg. at 59,913.
[4] Release, 91 Fed. Reg. at 59,914.
[5] Release, 91 Fed. Reg. at 59,914.
[6] Release, 91 Fed. Reg. at 59,914.
[7] For example, 37% of governance proposals that went to a vote received majority support in 2003. Kosmas Papadopoulos, ISS Analytics, The Long View: The Role of Shareholder Proposals in Shaping U.S. Corporate Governance (2000–2018), Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance (Feb. 6, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/06/the-long-view-the-role-ofshareholder-proposals-in-shaping-u-s-corporate-governance-2000-2018/.
[8] Sanford Lewis, Director, Shareholder Rights Group, Steven Rothstein, Chief Program Officer, Ceres, Dave Wallack, Executive Director, For the Long Term, Josh Zinner, Chief Executive Officer, Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, Thomas P. DiNapoli, New York State Comptroller, Bryan McGannon, Managing Director, US SIF, Rulemaking petition to retain Rule 14a-8, specifically the no-action process and the underlying exclusion and procedural rules July 23, 2026, https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/petitions/2026/petn4-917.pdf.
[9] Comment Letter of Business Roundtable 1–2 (Sept. 12, 2022), File No. S7-20-22 (Substantial Implementation, Duplication, and Resubmission of Shareholder Proposals Under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, Release No. 34-95267), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-20-22/s72022-20138936- 308637.pdf.
[10] See generally, Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–43, 46–51 (1983) (striking down an agency’s rescission of a rule for failing to provide a “reasoned analysis”). In that case, the rule at issue, involving installation of passive restraints in automobiles, had not yet even taken effect, a far-cry from the status of the well-entrenched 80-plus-year-old rule at issue here