Wells Fargo and Clawback Policies

Wells Fargo

In 2013, New York City Comptroller John C. Liu and the New York City Pension Funds (the “NYC Funds”) filed a shareholder proposal at Wells Fargo & Company (“Wells Fargo”) urging the company to expand its clawback policy. The NYC Funds withdrew the proposal after the bank adopted changes to its compensation policies.1

A clawback policy sets out the circumstances in which a company may recover compensation already awarded to senior management in cases of misconduct or mismanagement. The policy’s “triggers” define the events in which the board may decide to recoup compensation from its executives. Shareholders have a long history of engaging with companies to expand those triggers and the reach of the provisions within a company’s clawback policy.

Wells Fargo’s expansion of its clawback policy in 2013 demonstrates how shareholder engagement can enhance value for companies.

In 2016, three years after its engagement with the NYC Funds, Wells Fargo became embroiled in one of the largest consumer-fraud controversies in its history. Investigations identified the executives responsible, and one of the means of holding them accountable was through their compensation. The expanded 2013 clawback provisions positioned the board to recoup compensation from senior executives responsible for the fraud, ultimately benefiting the company and its shareholders financially.

The changes Wells Fargo made to its clawback policy between 2012 and 2013 track the expansion the NYC Funds sought, as described in the Comptroller’s correspondence regarding the engagement.2 Those expanded provisions were in place when the 2016 misconduct came to light, and the board’s subsequent recovery of compensation from the responsible executives proceeded under a policy that shareholder engagement had helped shape. The Comptroller’s correspondence credits the engagement with enabling that recovery.3

Previously, the company’s clawbacks could generally be applied only to executives who committed intentional or gross misconduct.4 Following the engagement with the Comptroller’s office, Wells Fargo expanded its policy to empower its board to claw back incentive pay from senior executives responsible for misconduct or errors that could or did cause serious financial or reputational harm (the “Discretionary Adjustment Provision”) and senior executives who improperly or negligently, including in a supervisory capacity, failed to address material risks to the company or a specific business group.5 The strengthened policy equipped Wells Fargo to hold executives accountable for mismanagement.

Background of the Scandal

On September 8, 2016, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the City and County of Los Angeles fined Wells Fargo a combined $185 million over more than two million deposit and credit card accounts that may not have been authorized. The CFPB’s $100 million share was, at the time, the largest penalty it had ever imposed.6 Wells Fargo terminated approximately 5,300 employees in connection with the improper sales practices.7 That September, former CEO John Stumpf agreed to forfeit all of his unvested equity awards, valued at $41.2 million, and the board determined that former Community Bank head Carrie Tolstedt would forfeit unvested equity awards valued at $18.8 million.8

On September 22, 2016, Comptroller Scott M. Stringer wrote to Wells Fargo’s board, referencing the NYC Funds’ 2013 engagement on the company’s clawback policy. The NYC Funds then held 10.5 million Wells Fargo shares, valued at approximately $485 million. Based on its 2013 correspondence with management regarding the clawback provisions, the Comptroller’s office estimated that approximately $19 million in incentive compensation paid to Ms. Tolstedt and approximately $41 million paid to Mr. Stumpf were subject to the Discretionary Adjustment Provision that their 2013 engagement pushed for and could be recouped at the board’s discretion.9

The Investigation and Further Recoveries

Following the outbreak of the scandal, the board’s independent directors commissioned an investigation into the retail sales practices that gave rise to the misconduct.10 On April 7, 2017, the board announced additional actions: it would claw back approximately $28 million in previously awarded equity from Mr. Stumpf, and Ms. Tolstedt would forfeit her outstanding stock options, valued at approximately $47 million.11 Ms. Tolstedt’s options were forfeited as a result of the board’s determination that cause existed for her termination.12 The board also eliminated 2016 bonuses and significantly reduced the payout on the 2014 Performance Share awards for eight members of its Operating Committee, by approximately $26 million. These included the heads of Corporate Risk, the Law Department, Human Resources and Audit, who were in place before the Operating Committee was reconstituted in November 2016, and the reductions were based on senior leadership’s collective accountability for the company’s overall operational and reputational risk.13 The board described its total compensation actions, which exceeded $180 million, as “among the largest in corporate history.”14

This case study demonstrates the immensely valuable private ordering that can result from engagement that is driven by the capacity to file shareholder proposals. In the absence of any regulatory requirement for expanded clawback policies, the Comptroller’s office pushed Wells Fargo to strengthen its own, and those provisions proved their importance three years later. Under the policy, the board was able to recoup compensation from executives responsible for mismanaging the company, saving both the company and its shareholders millions of dollars.

History of Clawback Provisions

Guardrails around executive compensation have existed for more than two decades. Under Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX 304”), if a public company is required to prepare an accounting restatement as a result of misconduct, the CEO and CFO must reimburse the company for incentive-based compensation received during the 12-month period following the misstated financial statement, regardless of whether they were personally involved in the misconduct, and the SEC may seek to enforce that recovery.15 The application of SOX 304 was narrow: it reached only the CEO and CFO, triggered only by an accounting restatement, and rested enforcement with the SEC rather than company boards.

Eight years later, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. Section 954 of the Act directed the SEC to adopt rules requiring the national securities exchanges to prohibit the listing of any company that does not adopt a policy to recover incentive-based compensation from current and former executive officers when the company files an accounting restatement.16 However, the statutory mandate did not take effect for more than a decade. The SEC first proposed implementing rules in 2015, reopened the comment period in October 2021 and again in June 2022, and formally adopted Rule 10D-1 only on October 26, 2022, twelve years after Dodd-Frank. Listed companies were required to adopt compliant clawback policies by December 1, 2023.17

Before the adoption of Rule 10D-1 in 2022, regulatory pressure on companies to adopt clawback policies was not absent, but it was not consistent enough for such policies to become standard industry practice.18 Amid this patchwork of regulatory guidance, and while the rule was being finalized, investors made a concerted push to negotiate improved disclosure and stronger clawback policies at their portfolio companies.

There is evidence that, over those twelve years, the corporate landscape regarding clawback policies shifted through private ordering, driven in large part by shareholder engagement and shareholder proposals. In addition to the shareholder request at Wells Fargo, the NYC Comptroller also sought to strengthen clawback policies at Capital One, Citigroup,19 Morgan Stanley, JPMorgan Chase, and Goldman Sachs.20 In 2012, the Comptroller’s office filed a proposal at Morgan Stanley, which the company initially sought to exclude from its ballot. Following engagement between the proponent and the company, the proposal was withdrawn, and Morgan Stanley stated that it would add disclosure clarifying the breadth of its clawback provisions, including specifically noting that those provisions could permit recovery of compensation for failure to appropriately supervise or manage an employee.21 Similarly, in 2012, JPMorgan Chase agreed to the shareholder request for added disclosure clarifying that its clawback provisions would generally apply to acts or omissions and that they could apply to persons in a supervisory role.22

The New York City Comptroller’s office has since described these engagements as part of a broader effort. In a 2021 comment letter to the Commission, it stated that since 2012 it had negotiated enhanced clawback policies with 27 companies in response to NYC Retirement Systems shareholder proposals, including Boeing, Johnson & Johnson, Merck and Pfizer alongside the banks named above. According to the letter, these policies generally allow boards to recover compensation for violations of law or company policy that cause significant financial or reputational harm, and for failure to manage or monitor the employees responsible, and most require disclosure of clawback actions. The letter cites Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase as boards that later moved to use these provisions, in connection with a Malaysian bribery scheme and the 2012 “London Whale” trading loss, respectively.23

Regulations such as TARP had introduced clawback requirements for certain banks in the years preceding these engagements. TARP required participating companies to ensure that their clawback provisions required senior executives and the next 20 highest-paid employees to repay bonuses based on materially inaccurate financial statements or performance metrics. Its reach, however, was limited. It applied only to companies, mostly financial institutions, that sold stock to the Treasury under the Capital Purchase Program or received bailout assistance, and its trigger was confined to inaccurate financial statements or performance metrics. What shareholders were negotiating with these companies already went beyond TARP’s scope: through engagement, the NYC Funds secured misconduct, supervisory and disclosure terms that TARP never required.

These were cases of shareholder engagement using shareholder proposals that, in most instances, resulted in the proposals being withdrawn. Separately, there is also a history of strong investor support for shareholder proposals related to clawback policies that went to a vote. In 2013, Amalgamated Bank filed a proposal at McKesson to strengthen the company’s clawback policy in light of the company’s fine related to allegedly overbilling customers in Medicaid programs.24 The proposal passed with 52.9% of the votes cast,25 and the company subsequently expanded its clawback policy in 2014. It removed “intentional” from the misconduct trigger, so that a clawback no longer required proof of intent, and replaced the “material negative revision” test with one covering pay based on inaccurate measures that cause significant harm once corrected. It also added a 12-month lookback on cash and equity incentives and committed to disclosing the outcome of clawback deliberations involving executive officers.26

Similarly, in 2019, the UAW Retiree Medical Benefits Trust (a co-filer of the McKesson resolution) filed a proposal at Mallinckrodt Pharmaceuticals (now Keenova Therapeutics) requesting disclosure of any executive compensation recouped in the previous fiscal year. The proposal centered on the heightened scrutiny of opioid manufacturers such as Mallinckrodt, which had faced a strong legal response to opioid distribution. The Mallinckrodt proposal received 52.92% of the votes cast,27 presenting another example of the benefits of shareholder-led private ordering. The request was not to expand the company’s policies, but simply to report the details of any recoupment should it occur. As the proponent stated: “Mallinckrodt has mechanisms in place to recover incentive compensation in the event of misconduct, with triggering events not limited to the financial misstatement context. However, without disclosure, investors cannot determine if those provisions are being used.”28

Shareholder proposals, and the subsequent changes in clawback policies across the market, have been value-enhancing in a way that is directly attributable to the use of proposals to drive shareholder engagement. These clawback policies protect companies and shareholders from financial losses associated with board and management malfeasance and improve incentives for boards and managers to act to protect the interests of all stakeholders.29

In October 2022, the SEC adopted Rule 10D-1, implementing the Dodd-Frank mandate. The rule directs the national securities exchanges to require every listed company to adopt, enforce and publicly disclose a written clawback policy. Under that policy, a company must recover incentive-based compensation erroneously awarded to current and former executive officers during the three fiscal years preceding an accounting restatement, regardless of fault. Companies must file the policy with their annual report and disclose any recovery it triggers. A company that fails to adopt, comply with or disclose a compliant policy is subject to delisting.30

Rule 10D-1 requires only no-fault recovery triggered by an accounting restatement. The more ambitious provisions, both before and after the rule, extend to misconduct, supervisory failures and disclosure of clawback decisions. These were terms shareholders pressed for in proposals and engagements with their portfolio companies such as at Mallinckrodt and Wells Fargo.31 It was shareholders who ensured that the company adopted strong accountability mechanisms. Considering the strong shareholder feedback, the company expanded its clawback policy to require disclosure of executive recoupment.32

The history of clawback policies demonstrates that private ordering empowered by the shareholder proposal process works. The protections the Commission ultimately mandated, recovery of unearned executive pay and disclosure of that recovery, are protections shareholders advocated for at their portfolio companies years before they became law. Where regulation is still developing, or where the market is still determining how to address an emerging risk, shareholders are the ones who push companies toward sound governance practices, in this case accountability for executives who engage in misconduct, using shareholder proposals as a critical tool to spur engagement. Even twelve years after Dodd-Frank, Rule 10D-1 reaches only restatement-triggered recovery, and the misconduct provisions that shareholders negotiated continue to do the work the rule does not. Rescinding Rule 14a-8 would remove the mechanism that produced these protections, at precisely the stage when it is most needed.

Notes

  1. “Citi, Wells Fargo, Capital One Agree to Expand Clawback Policy: NYC Comptroller,” TheStreet (Mar. 14, 2013). The Comptroller’s office later confirmed, in a letter to the Commission, that “Wells Fargo enhanced its Clawback Policy in 2013 in response to a NYCRS shareholder proposal.” Letter from Scott M. Stringer, New York City Comptroller, to the Commission, File No. S7-12-15 (Nov. 22, 2021): https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-12-15/s71215-9385398-262706.pdf↩︎

  2. Wells Fargo, 2012 Proxy Statement, at 76; Wells Fargo, Form of Performance Share Award Agreement (Feb. 28, 2012).↩︎

  3. Attribution relies on the Comptroller’s correspondence regarding the engagement. At the time of the engagement and the subsequent controversy, companies were not required to publish the full terms of their clawback policies, and boards retain discretion over how much to disclose about individual recovery decisions. Public records therefore do not always identify which specific provisions a board applied to a given executive. These gaps reflect limits on what companies are required to disclose, not any indication that the expanded provisions went unused.↩︎

  4. Wells Fargo, 2012 Proxy Statement, at 76; Wells Fargo, Form of Performance Share Award Agreement (Feb. 28, 2012).↩︎

  5. “Citi, Wells Fargo, Capital One Agree to Expand Clawback Policy: NYC Comptroller,” TheStreet (Mar. 14, 2013); Wells Fargo, 2013 Proxy Statement, at 61.

    Under the form of performance share award agreement Wells Fargo adopted in 2013, awards are subject to the following conditions:

    Performance Conditions. This Award is fully conditioned on and subject to performance adjustments, which include the right of the Committee to cancel all or any unpaid portion of an Award, if the Committee determines in its sole discretion that:

    • You engage in misconduct which has or might reasonably be expected to have reputational or other harm to the Company or any conduct that constitutes Cause;
    • You engage in misconduct or commit a material error that causes or might reasonably be expected to cause significant financial or reputational harm to the Company or your business group;
    • The Award was based on materially inaccurate performance metrics, whether or not you were responsible for the inaccuracy;
    • You improperly or with gross negligence, including in a supervisory capacity, fail to identify, escalate, monitor, or manage, in a timely manner and as reasonably expected, risks material to the Company or your business group; or
    • The Company or your business group suffers a material downturn in its financial performance or suffers a material failure of risk management

    Wells Fargo, Form of Performance Share Award Agreement (Feb. 26, 2013), § 8.↩︎

  6. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Fines Wells Fargo $100 Million for Widespread Illegal Practice of Secretly Opening Unauthorized Accounts,” press release (Sept. 8, 2016): https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-fines-wells-fargo-100-million-widespread-illegal-practice-secretly-opening-unauthorized-accounts/↩︎

  7. Letter from Scott M. Stringer to Lloyd H. Dean, Chair, Human Resources Committee, Wells Fargo (Sept. 22, 2016), at 1–3: https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Comptroller-Stringer-To-Wells-Fargo_9.22.2016.pdf↩︎

  8. Wells Fargo, 2017 Proxy Statement, at 62.↩︎

  9. Letter from Scott M. Stringer to Lloyd H. Dean, Chair, Human Resources Committee, Wells Fargo (Sept. 22, 2016), at 1–3: https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Comptroller-Stringer-To-Wells-Fargo_9.22.2016.pdf↩︎

  10. Independent Directors of the Board of Wells Fargo & Company, Sales Practices Investigation Report (Apr. 10, 2017).↩︎

  11. Wells Fargo, Form 8-K (Apr. 7, 2017): https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/72971/000119312517119979/d376276d8k.htm↩︎

  12. Wells Fargo, 2017 Proxy Statement, at 72 n.2 (options forfeited on termination for cause); Sales Practices Investigation Report, at 9 (cause finding). The Comptroller’s estimate included Ms. Tolstedt’s $19 million (see Letter from Scott M. Stringer to Lloyd H. Dean, Sept. 22, 2016).↩︎

  13. Wells Fargo, 2017 Proxy Statement, at 63.↩︎

  14. Wells Fargo, Schedule 14A Additional Materials (Apr. 10, 2017): https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/72971/000119312517118654/d375947ddefa14a.htm↩︎

  15. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a): https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2011-title15/pdf/USCODE-2011-title15-chap98-subchapIII-sec7243.pdf↩︎

  16. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 954, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-4); see also 87 Fed. Reg. 73076, 73076-77 (November 28, 2022): https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-11-28/pdf/2022-23757.pdf↩︎

  17. Securities and Exchange Commission, “SEC Adopts Compensation Recovery Listing Standards and Disclosure Rules,” press release 2022-192 (October 26, 2022): https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2022-192. Under the final rule, issuers must adopt a recovery policy within 60 days after the applicable exchange listing standards take effect; the NYSE and Nasdaq standards took effect on October 2, 2023.↩︎

  18. Under TARP (a 2009 Treasury rule for banks that accepted federal bailout funds), senior executives and the next 20 highest-paid employees had to repay bonuses based on materially inaccurate financial statements or performance metrics, but only while their bank still owed the money (U.S. Department of the Treasury, TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance, Interim Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 28394 (June 15, 2009), codified at 31 C.F.R. Part 30: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2009-06-15/pdf/E9-13868.pdf). For the later engagements discussed below, by which point the banks had repaid those funds, TARP was likely not applicable to them. In 2010, bank regulators (the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve, the FDIC and the Office of Thrift Supervision) issued joint guidance asking banks to balance risk and reward in incentive pay and to maintain active board oversight, but it did not require a clawback policy (Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 36395 (June 25, 2010): https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2010-06-25/html/2010-15435.htm). Proposed rules under Dodd-Frank in 2011 and 2016 went further (Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 21170 (April 14, 2011): https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2011-04-14/html/2011-7937.htm); the 2016 version would have reached misconduct causing financial or reputational harm, but neither was ever finalized (Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, Proposed Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 37670, 37681 (June 10, 2016): https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-06-10/html/2016-11788.htm). These signals were present in the market, and they likely shaped how banks approached pay. None of them, however, required the misconduct, supervisory and disclosure terms the NYC Funds negotiated.↩︎

  19. Paul Burton, “Liu: NYC Pensions, Banks Agree on Clawbacks,” The Bond Buyer (March 14, 2013) (Capital One, Citigroup and Wells Fargo): https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/liu-nyc-pensions-banks-agree-on-clawbacks↩︎

  20. Office of the New York City Comptroller, “Liu, Pension Funds: Tougher Clawbacks on Executive Pay Needed,” press release PR11-12-098 (December 21, 2011) (Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase and Morgan Stanley): https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/PR11-12-098.pdf↩︎

  21. Morgan Stanley, SEC Staff No-Action Letter (February 3, 2012), including the proponent’s withdrawal letter (February 2, 2012) and Morgan Stanley’s email of February 1, 2012 describing the added clawback disclosure: https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2012/nyccomptroller020312-14a8.pdf↩︎

  22. JPMorgan Chase & Co., SEC Staff No-Action Letter (March 14, 2012), including the proponent’s withdrawal letter (March 12, 2012): https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2012/nyceretirement031412-14a8.pdf↩︎

  23. New York City Comptroller Scott M. Stringer, comment letter on File No. S7-12-15 (November 22, 2021), pp. 2–4: https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-12-15/s71215-9385398-262706.pdf↩︎

  24. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/927653/000130817913000277/lmckesson_def14a.htm#_N14EFE↩︎

  25. The proposal received 97,213,891 votes for and 86,413,315 against. McKesson Corporation, Form 8-K (August 2, 2013), Item 5.07: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000927653/000156178713000015/mck_8kxannualxmeetingx0731.htm↩︎

  26. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/927653/000130817914000225/lmck2014_def14a.htm#lmcka016↩︎

  27. Votes: 33,719,668 for and 30,002,404 against. Mallinckrodt plc, Form 8-K (May 2019), Item 5.07: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1567892/000156789219000019/a8-k05152019.htm↩︎

  28. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1567892/000119312519096026/d721360ddef14a.htm#toc721360_41↩︎

  29. Adapted from Oxfam America, comment letter to the SEC on proposed amendments to Rule 14a-8 (2020).↩︎

  30. Securities and Exchange Commission, Listing Standards for Recovery of Erroneously Awarded Compensation, 87 Fed. Reg. 73076 (November 28, 2022): https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-11-28/pdf/2022-23757.pdf↩︎

  31. Securities and Exchange Commission, Listing Standards for Recovery of Erroneously Awarded Compensation, 87 Fed. Reg. 73076 (November 28, 2022): https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-11-28/pdf/2022-23757.pdf↩︎

  32. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1567892/000119312520095955/d902836ddef14a.htm↩︎

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The Economic Impact of Rescinding the Shareholder Proposal Rule